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Certainly a careful reading of this volume should serve to
break down many of our inhibitions against change. We can
laugh at the violence of the reaction against Pound's unorthodox
suggestions, but we should resolve to exorcise our own minds of
every vestige of bias and prejudice which might lead us into the
same error.
George W. Hardy, Jr.*
by Morris D. Forkosch. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 1956. Pp. xiv, 856. $12.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,

This is the second treatise on administrative law to be published by Bobbs-Merrill in a period of somewhat less than five
years. Despite the many special virtues of its earlier publication,1 it was not a full treatment of the subject; the present volume is more clearly a general treatise and comparable to the
1951 work of Davis.2 The arrangement is logical, with delegation problems treated initially in some 180 pages, non-adjudicatory and adjudicatory administrative functions in some 400
pages, and judicial review and related topics in some 380 additional pages.
The author, in his introductory pages, suggests that his treatment may be somewhat radical in that pedagogical techniques
are used throughout; in the main the "technique" consists in
copious use of charts in the analysis of procedures and powers
and in the detailed development of a "twelve question analysis8
of an administrative proceeding" (questions about delegation,
hearing requirements, and judicial review). In addition, however, there is constant and useful reliance upon judicial analogies
for administrative practice, a reliance which Forkosch calls "the
parallel approach." There is also much homely classroom
analogy. Part I is captioned "A Preliminary Outline of Administrative Law." It is followed by Part II, devoted to "The
Delegation of Powers: Limitations on and Types of"; Part III,
devoted to "Non-Adjudicatory Functioning of Administrative
Agencies"; Part IV, devoted to "The Adjudicatory Functioning
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Administrative Law, by Reginald Parker. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
Indianapolis, 1951.
2. Administrative Law, by Kenneth Culp Davis. West Publishing Company,
St. Paul, 1951.
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of Administrative Agencies: Notice"; and Part V, devoted to
"Review: Agency and Judicial."
Chapter XIV obviously embodies the results of many years
of teaching and practice; it is a substantial harvest. Here, in
patient detail, is an analysis of the substantial evidence rule
which should lift the spirits of students of evidence as well as
administrative law. The section and its sub-parts extend over
almost fifty pages or more than five percent of the text; for this
reviewer, the inadequacies of blackboard analysis being what
they are, it serves particularly well as a library reference for
those still puzzled after classroom time has been exhausted.
The charts which Forkosch uses in such profusion are genuinely useful in making his analysis of the substantial evidence
rule. No detail is omitted; the student is painstakingly escorted
through the pleading in which the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action are alleged, through the hearing and the
adducing of evidence, through the process of finding the facts,
and finally through the conclusion of law stage in which the
determination is arrived at that all ultimate facts essential to
the cause of action have been alleged and proved.
The distinction between the substantial evidence rule applicable to agency review and the "clearly erroneous" rule applicable to district court review is presented with competent
clarity; perhaps in part this is due to reliance upon the lucid
analysis of Judge Frank in his second Universal Camera decision, 4 and upon the analysis of Justice Rutledge (then Judge
Rutledge) in the International Association of Machinists case. 5
In any event, the greater limitations imposed upon a court reviewing agency action as distinguished from trial court action
emerge in a form readily grasped by the student; with the background laid by Forkosch, the significance of review limited to a
determination of whether reasonable men could differ as to the
inferences to be drawn from established facts as against the
free substitution of judgment possible where review is of a district court decision, is amply apparent as a device for insuring
maximum, utilization of agency expertness. The limitations of
Universal Cameras are kept in sharp focus and its effects limited
to broadening judicial review only where agency adjudication
4. N.L.R.B.' v. Universal Camera Corporation, 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir., 1951).
5. International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 110 F.2d 29 (D.C.
Cir., 1939); aff'd, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
.6. Universal'Camera Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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discards an examiner's testimonial inferences or fails to consider
the whole record.
Under scope of review in Part IV, there are excellent sections
devoted to the many-faceted problem of distinguishing between
questions of law and questions of fact on review. Here there is
not, however, the same lucid analysis which Forkosch displays in
the sections devoted to the adjudicatory processes proper; he
almost contents himself with such timeworn, quotable cliches as
"the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact
has been found a will-of-the-wisp" and "the knife of policy
alone affects an artificial cleavage." Not quite, however. There
is useful discourse, interlarded with illuminating quotations
from the decisions, on judicial review of the rule-making or lawmaking function of the agencies when Congress has legislated
but has not defined except in broad abstractions; there is little
analysis of the difference between adjudicatory and legislative
facts, however, and consequently insufficient allusion to the reasons which render a simple "rational basis" test a sufficient limitation on the fact finding processes incident to rule-making
whereas fact finding in adjudication is made subject to the
"substantial evidence" test or even, in some instances, to a complete reweighing of the evidence.
It seems to this reviewer; also, that, even at the risk of belaboring the obvious, the author should stop and explain such
statements as one finds under a section devoted to distinguishing
"matters of law" from "matters of fact" that "the substantial
evidence rule is a rule of law though it deals with facts." Thus,
it would be useful to note that generally a rule of law consists
in an attempted verbal description of a category of conduct or
phenomena (facts) to which legal consequences have'been attached and that such categories of conduct (facts) include procedural conduct during the course of an administrative adjudication as well as categories of conduct (facts) in everyday affairs. The student may then discover for himself whether a
court is using "matter of law" in reference to deciding what refinements of meaning are to be attributed to the words used in
a substantive rule of conduct or is using "matter of law" in
reference to the application of such a rule governing review procedure (i.e., the substantial evidence rule) ; the latter "matter
of law" obviously entails fact finding by the court despite the
nomenclature, since the court must satisfy itself that.the evi-
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dentiary facts in the record it is reviewing do in fact support
the inference that reasonable minds could differ as to the substantive inferences to be drawn from such facts. But it is nonetheless called a "matter of law." Perhaps the terminology "matter for the court" in this latter instance would be preferable to
"matter of law," if fact finding and law-making or law interpreting are to be kept adequately disentangled. The Dobson
case, 7 which is analyzed under a section devoted to mixed questions of law and fact, would have been an excellent case with
which to point up more sharply the anomalousness of this use
of the labels "matters of law" and "matters of fact" and to note
that the real meaning may be "matters for the agency" as distinguished from "matters for the court." Conceivably, the Dobson holding on scope of review might not subsequently have been
reversed by Congress if the issue therein had been candidly
labelled a question of law but one properly within the province
of the agency, the solution to which would not be disturbed since
the agency solution had a rational basis in legislative fact; certainly the mere fact that the solution dealt with an accounting
problem would be an insufficient basis for removing it from
the realm of "law" since on this basis a good part of the Internal
Revenue Code would lose its status as law. The decision in Gray
v. Powell" rather candidly recognized such agency "questions of
law" (as have several decisions since that case) and has never
been reversed by Congress. It can be persuasively argued that
the APA now allows for only a limited, "rational basis" test of
agency law-making; the opening sentence of Section 10 excepts
from the general provisions of judicial review "agency action
...

by law committed to agency discretion." There seems hardly

serious question that a Supreme Court determination that limited law-making has been "committed to agency discretion" has
been committed "by law." At one point the author seems persuaded that such law-making or ad hoc rule-making, at least in
Chenery,9 is not really making new law but is merely "action
within delegated authority" ;1o this rather obviously unsatisfactory characterization is not sought to be defended or maintained,
however, and is abandoned as the analysis of judicial review
progresses."
These are minor protestations, however; the Very fact that
7. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
8. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
9. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

10. § 256.
11. §341.
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they can be made adds rather than detracts to the value of the
work as a teaching aid. Substantially everything of importance
in administrative law is touched upon after all and an analysis
completely satisfactory to every devotee is hardly attainable.
The format is conventional and good; some, to be sure, would
prefer the paging to be given its usual place and the sectionizing
relegated to lesser dominance. Likewise, reference to pages in
the index and case table, rather than to sections, though more
laborious, would have given readier access to the author's analysis and documentation. However, this deficiency is in part
compensated for by a detailed table of contents referenced to
sections and pages.
Melvin G. Dakin*
LAW OF TORTS, by Leon Green, Wex S. Malone,
Willard H. Pedrick, and James A. Rahl, West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul. Pp. xxvi, 855.

CASES ON THE

In 1931, Dean Leon Green published his Judicial Process in
Tort Cases, and in 1939 his second edition appeared. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Dean Green was quite
churlish to prior compilers of torts materials. His materials expressed ingenuity and did not follow what had evolved to be the
classical structure of torts casebooks. Adopting what has been
called a functional perspective and viewing the subject matter
from the eclectic approach of sociological jurisprudence, Dean
Green pointed to the work environment of rule and doctrine. It
was a unique collection of materials.
This year, in collaboration with able assistants, an even finer
if less novel collection of tort materials has appeared under the
new title Cases on the Law of Torts. The current edition, although it features a sparkling collection of recent cases and new
text, follows the same outline and general organization of the
earlier editions except for the addition of new materials on "injuries resulting in death" and "conversion" and the elimination
of materials on defamation and privacy which have been incorporated into a separate volume to be used in a separate course
in relational interests. But it is not the details but the structure
of these materials and their impact upon students of torts which
warrants our examination.

